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STATEMENT OF SECOND INJURY FUND ISSUE ON APPEAL 
Did the Industrial Commission commit reversible error when it held 
that the 1979 Utah Legislative Amendment to U.C.A. Section 35-1-68 removed the 
liability of the Second Injury Fund for dependency death benefits after the 
first 312 weeks and, in effect, assigned the liability for all dependency 
death benefits to the employer/carrier? 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE AS IT PERTAINS TO SECOND INJURY FUND LIABILITY 
It is not controverted and the record shows that Gene Webster 
husband of respondent Anna Webster died on December 15, 1982 due to 
complications arising out of his industrial accident of July 20, 1979. The 
312 week period of statutory benefits from the date of injury ended in 1985. 
At that time Mrs. Webster was receiving $179.00 per week. She applied to the 
Commission for continued benefits pursuant to Section 35-1-68, as amended in 
1979. The Second Injury Fund declined liability, pointing out that the 
amendment in 1979 by the Utah Legislature of Section 35-1-68, effectively 
removed the Second Injury Fund from the liability for dependency death 
benefits after the 312 week period which had existed prior to the 1979 
amendment • 
Applicant requested a hearing which was held on June 26, 1985. The 
Administrative Law Judge, in an Order dated July 2, 1985, held Mrs. Webster to 
be partially dependent and ordered the self-insured employer, appellant 
herein, to pay her $89.50 per week (R. 78-80). Applicant filed two separate 
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Motions for Review. The first, filed on August 28, 1985, contended that the 
widow claimant is not a dependent because of other financial resources 
available to her. The Second Motion for Review was filed October 8, 1985 and 
constitutes Appellant's first contention that the additional death benefits 
should be paid out of the Second Injury Fund rather than by the employer as 
Ordered by the Administrative Law Judge. 
On January 9, 1986 the full Industrial Commission in a unanimous 
Order Denying Motion for Review, denied both Motions for Review and, as 
pertaining to Second Injury Fund liability, specifically held that the 1979 
amendment to Section 35-1-68 deleted the prior language in that section 
assigning liability to the Second Injury Fund for dependency benefits after 
the 312 week period and replaced it with language assigning responsibility for 
dependency benefits to the employer or insurance carrier [Section 35-1-68 (2) 
(c) (iii)l. 
On January 11, 1986, Appellant filed its Petition for Review with 
this Court asserting that the industrial Commission commited reversible error 
in refusing to order the Second Injury Fund to pay dependency benefits after 
the expiration of the initial 312 week period. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT BY RESPONDENT 
SECOND INJURY FUND 
The obligation of the Second Injury Fund for dependency death 
benefits was removed by Legislative amendment to Section 35-1-68, U.C.A., 
2 
passed March 8, 1979, in effect May 8, 1979. The amendment deleted the former 
language in that Section asigning liability for continued dependency death 
benefits to the Second Injury Fund and inserted new language specifically 
assigning responsibility for all dependency death benefits to the employer or 
insurance carrier. 
ARGUMENT 
I. Prior to 1979, Section 35-1-68, U.C.A. assigned responsibility for 
dependency death benefits to the employer or its insurance carrier from the 
date of death to date not to exceed 312 weeks (6 years). Section 35-1-68 (2) 
and 35-1-68 (3). Following the termination of that period, responsibility for 
continued dependency death benefits was specifically assigned to the Second 
Injury Fund (then called Special Fund) by subsections (4) and (5) of Section 
35-1-68. The pertinent language of Section 35-1-68 prior to its amendment in 
1979 is as follows: 
35-1-68. Second injury fund created-Purpose-Funding-Injury causing 
death-Filing claim within one year-payment into fund when no 
dependents-Payment to dependents-Presumptions of dependency-Payment to 
partially dependent persons-Effect of remarriage. 
In case injury causes death within the period of six years from the 
date of the accident, the employer or insurance carrier shall pay the 
burial expenses of the deceased as provided in section 35-1-81, and 
further benefits in the amounts and to the persons as follows: 
(1) If there are no dependents,. . . . 
(2) If there are wholly dependent persons at the time of the 
death, the payment shall be 66 2/3% of the decedent1 s average weekly wage 
at the time of the injury, but not more than a maximum of 85% of the 
state average weekly wage at the time of the injury per week and not less 
than a minimum of $45 per week plus $5 for a dependent spouse and $5 for 
each dependent minor child under the age of eighteen years, up to a 
maximum of four such dependent minor children not to exceed the average 
weekly wage of the employee at the time of the injury, but not to exceed 
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85% of the state average weekly wage at the time of the injury per week, 
to continue during dependency for the remainder of the period between the 
date of the death and not to exceed six years or 312 weeks after the date 
of the injury. 
(3) If there are partly dependent persons at the time of the 
death, the payment shall be 66 2/3% of the decedent's average weekly 
wages at the time of the injury, but not more than a maximum of 85% of 
the state average weekly wage at the time of the injury per week and not 
less than a minimum of $45 per week, to continue during dependency for 
the remainder of the period between the date of death and not to exceed 
six years or 312 weeks after the date of injury as the commission in each 
case may determine and shall not amount to more than a maximum of 
$15,600. The benefits provided for in this subsection shall be in 
keeping with the circumstances and conditions of dependency existing at 
the date of injury, and any amount awarded by the commission under this 
subsection must be consistent with the general provisions of this title. 
(4) If there are wholly dependent persons and also partly dependent 
persons at the time of death, the commission may apportion the benefits 
as it deems just and equitable; provided, that the total benefits awarded 
to all parties concerned shall not exceed the maximum provided for by 
law. Following the period during which the employer or its insurance 
carrier is required to pay benefits under this act, there shall be paid 
to such persons, during the period of their dependency, out of the 
special fund provided for in subsection (1), the same benefits as paid by 
the employer or its insurance carrier, as provided in subsection (2) and 
(3). The issue of dependency shall be reviewed at the time application 
is made for additional benefits from the special fund, (emphasis supplied) 
(5) • The commission shall order that, there be paid to such 
dependents as provided in subsections (2) and (3), benefits at the rate 
of 66 2/3% of the deceased's average weekly wages at the time of the 
injury, but not more than a maximum of 85% of the state average weekly 
wage at the time of the injury per week and not less than a minimum of 
$45 per week, out of that special fund provided for in subsection (1) and 
for that period of time beginning with the time that the payments to be 
made by the employer or its insurance carrier terminate and ending upon 
the termination of said dependency, (emphasis supplied) 
(6) 
II. 1979 Amendment: Section 35-1-68 following the Legislative 
amendment, effective May 8, 1979, reads as pertinent hereto as follows: 
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35-1-68. Second injury fund-Injury causing death-Burial 
expenses-Payments by employer or insurance carrier-Filing claim within 
one year-Payments to dependents-Review of dependency-Apportionment of 
benefits (emphasis supplied) 
\ Jm J e • • C C 
(2) In case injury causes death within the period of six years 
from the date of the accident, the employer or insurance carrier shall 
pay the burial expenses of the deceased as provided in section 35-1-81, 
and further benefits in the amounts and to the persons as follows: 
(a) 
(b) (i) If there are wholly dependent persons at the time of the 
death, the payment by the employer or insurance carrier shall be 66 2/3% 
of the decedent1 s average weekly wage at the time of the injury, but not 
more than a maximum of 85% of the state average weekly wage at the time 
of the injury per week and not less than a minimum of $45 per week plus 
$5 for a dependent spouse and $5 for each dependent minor child under the 
age of eighteen years, up to a maximum of four such dependent minor 
children not to exceed the average weekly wage of the employee at the 
time of the injury, but not to exceed 85% of the state average weekly 
wage at the time of the injury per week, to continue during dependency 
for the remainder of the period between the date of the death and not to 
exceed six years or 312 weeks after the date of the injury. 
(ii) The weekly payment to wholly dependent persons during 
dependency following the expiration of the first six-year period 
described in subsection (2)(b)(i) shall be an amount equal to the weekly 
benefits paid to those wholly dependent persons during the initial 
six-year period, reduced by 50% of any weekly federal social security 
death benefits paid to those wholly dependent persons. 
(iii) The issue of dependency shall be subject to review by the 
commission at the end of the initial six-year period and annually 
thereafter. If in any such review it is determined that, under the facts 
and circumstances existing at that time, the applicant is no longer a 
wholly dependent person, the applicant may be considered a partly 
dependent or non-dependent person and shall be paid such benefits as the 
commission may determine pursuant to subsection (2)(c)(ii). 
(iv) For purposes of any dependency determination, a surviving 
spouse of a deceased employee shall be conclusively presumed to be wholly 
dependent for a six-year period from the date of death of the employee. 
This presumption shall not apply after the initial six-year period and, 
in determining the then existing annual income of the surviving spouse, 
the commission shall exclude 50% of any federal social security death 
benefits received by that surviving spouse. 
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(c) (i) If there are partly dependent persons at the time of the 
death, the payment shall be 66 2/3% of the decedent's average weekly 
wages at the time of the injury, but not more than a maximum of 85% of 
the state average weekly wage at the time of the injury per week and not 
less than a minimum of $45 per week, to continue during dependency for 
the remainder of the period betwen the date of death and not to exceed 
six years or 312 weeks after the date of injury as the commission in each 
case may determine and shall not amount to more than a maximum of 
$18,720. The benefits provided for in this subsection shall be in 
keeping with the circumstances and conditions of dependency existing at 
the date of injury, and any amount awarded by the commission under this 
subsection must be consistent with the general provisions of this title. 
(ii) Benefits to persons determined to be partly dependent 
pursuant to subsection (2)(b)(iii) shall be determined by the commission 
in keeping with the circumstances and conditions of dependency existing 
at the time of the dependency review and may be paid in a weekly amount 
not exceeding the maximum weekly rate that partly dependent person would 
receive if wholly dependent. 
(iii) Payments under this section shall be paid to such persons 
during their dependency by the employer or insurance carrier, (emphasis 
supplied) 
(d) 
(e) 
Analysis of the dependency death benefit provision of Section 
35-1-68 before and after the legislative amendments of 1979 reveals clearly 
the change in responsibility for the payment of such benefits made by the 
Legislature in its enactment of the 1979 amendments. Under the pre-1979 
Statute the responsibility of the employer or insurance carrier is clearly 
limited to the 312 weeks (6 year) period following the date of injury (death) 
by subsections (2) and (3) while subsections (4) and (5) of 35-1-68 
unmistakably require the Special Fund to continue the same benefits during 
their continued dependency beyond the termination of the employer/carrier 
liability. 
Likewise, the intent of the Legislature in the 1979 amendments to 
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exempt the Second Injury Fund from future dependency death benefits and to 
assign liability for such benefits to the employer/carrier is manifest beyond 
question* All references to the Special Fund (Second Injury Fund) with 
respect to dependency death benefits were deleted and new language was 
inserted in the statute expressly assigning the responsibility for all 
dependency death benefits to the employer/carrier. What could be more clear 
than the new language of Section 35-1-68 found in subsection (c) (iii) that: 
Payments under this section shall be paid to such persons during 
their dependency by the employer or insurance carrier. 
In summary, the Legislature in its 1979 amendment to Section 
35-1-68 accomplished its dual objectives of (1) removing the Second Injury 
Fund from any future liability for continued dependency death benefits and (2) 
assigning responsibility for all such benefits to the employer or its 
insurance carrier. As the Industrial Commission indicated in its Denial of 
Motion for Review, the 1979 amendments to this Section were in response to the 
increasing liability placed on the Second Injury Fund. At the same time, 
however, the impact upon the employer/carrier was alleviated by additional 
amendments providing for annual review of the dependency issue after the 
initial six year period, the exclusion of the dependency presumption after 
that date and the offset of 50% of any federal social security death benefits 
received by the surviving spouse. Such changes, along with those made on the 
dependency of spouses and minor children and the effect of remarriage of the 
surviving spouse, operate to support beyond reasonable controversy the 
decision of the Industrial Commission that the 1979 amendments to Section 
35-1-68 effectively removed the Second Injury Fund from liability for 
continued dependency death benefits. 
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RESPONSE TO POSITION ASSERTED BY APPELLANT 
The 1979 amendment to Section 35-1-68 removing the Second Injury 
Fund from liability for continued dependency death benefits is neither 
affected by nor inconsistent with Section 35-1-70 referred to by Appellant as 
being determinative of its liability in this controversy. 
Appellant has asserted that Section 35-1-70 somehow applies to this 
case and operates to overcome and nullify the new language in Section 35-1-88 
enacted in 1979 carrying out the intent of the Legislature (1) to assign 
responsibility for continued dependency death benefits to the employer or its 
insurance carrier and (2) to remove any liability for such benefits from the 
Second Injury Fund. As the Industrial Commission stated in its Denial of 
Motion for Review, the "special cases" provision of Section 35-1-70 is not 
contradictory to Section 35-1-68, as amended in 1979, and does not apply in 
this controversy in any event. As pointed out by the Commission, Section 
35-1-70 gives the Commission, in its discretion, certain authority to continue 
benefits which otherwise would have been terminated. In this case, 
applicant's benefits have not "otherwise been terminated"; therefore there is 
no occasion for the Commission to exercise its discretion under 35-1-70. 
In summary, Appellants reliance upon Section 35-1-70 is misplaced. 
That Section was not intended nor does it operate to nullify the expressed 
intent of the Legislature in 1979 to remove the Second Injury Fund from 
liability for continued dependency death benefits. 
CONCLUSION 
It was not error for the Commission to refuse to order the Second 
Injury Fund to pay the continued dependency death benefits in this case. 
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Analysis of the death benefit provisions of the Act, Section 35-1-68, before 
and after its amendment in 1979 by the Utah Legislature reveals unmistakably 
that the Legislature intended to and in fact clearly accomplished its 
objectives (1) to remove the Second Injury Fund from its former liability for 
continued dependency death benefits and (2) to assign responsibility for such 
continued dependency benefits to the employer or its insurance carrier. The 
amendments which became effective May 8, 1979 are not in conflict with Section 
35-1-70 as asserted by appellant nor are they nullified or modified by that 
Section with respect to the liability of the Second Injury Fund in this case. 
Respectfully submitted this 3d day of June, 1986. 
r>/„. I'-
Erie V. Boorman 
Administrator and Attorney 
For the Respondent Second Injury Fund 
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